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Abstract: the paper examines a few methods for drawing categories that can be employed in special 
sciences. By examining some of the core phenomena that laid the basis of the most prominent approaches to 
typing in special sciences, it shows that we must accept a novel approach to delineating scientific kinds. Its 
peculiarity is that makes the latter parts of an array of structures, rather than possessing a fixed one. This 
can provide with a useful principal line of approach the leaders attempting to organize complex and evolv-
ing phenomena.
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One of the unfulfilled ideals of the mod-
ern mind is that of “unity of science”. It is , 
at the core, a reductive ideal (Oppenheim 
and Putnam 1958). A key part part of its re-
ductive approach consists, most often, in 
finding matches between the kinds one em-
ploys to theorize about certain processes and 
unique types of entities on a lower level in 
a mereological scale. This is widely assumed 
to provide reductions of the theory on the 
upper level to that on the lower one, and 
ultimately to the most basic, namely that of 
physics. Nevertheless this ideal, according to 
which every type of entity has to be shown 
to be ultimately equated with a definite type 
of microstructure, has been vehemently chal-
lenged. One source was the functional ap-
proach, originating in the philosophy of 121 Change and Leadership
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mind. The origins of functionalism lay in the 
assimilation of our psychological states with 
the functioning of a Turing machine. The 
same way a Turing machine is characterized 
by  a  “machine  table”,  which  describes  the 
transitions between an input, internal states 
and output, a physical system will have an 
internal functional structure, which describes 
steady causal relations between the sensory 
stimulations, internal states and the behav-
ioral output.(Putnam 1967). Mental proper-
ties are nothing more than places typically 
held in causal chains. What individuates the 
mental states is their causal relations with the 
input and output. (see Lewis 1972).
One rather immediate consequence of 
the functionalist outlook is the multiple re-
alizability. The causal structure involved can 
be realized by a host of realization bases, not 
amenable to a unique description in the lan-
guage of the theories dealing with the infe-
rior levels.  Such functional descriptions of 
phenomena imply nothing with regard to 
microstructural properties of what under-
lies this web of causal relations.  From this 
standpoint, a theory about the mind means 
tracking causes at this upper level, without 
specifying anything what the lower level 
phenomena implementing it are supposed 
to be. Any assembly of entities that can enter 
into the patterns of causation specified by the 
functional description would do.
Although functionalism has started as 
a stance on the theories about mind and be-
havior, philosophers have been quick to re-
alize that the same issues at the core of this 
approach also face other special sciences. 
There are situations where our only chance 
to make science is to track this upper level 
causal chains, between items that are typed 
so that they would be capable to enter into 
stable causal relation, but without being ca-
pable to effectively indicate any fixed mi-
crostructural pendants. As Fodor remarks 
(Fodor  1974),  there  are  scientifically  inter-
estening general statements that can be made 
about items whose physical description has 
nothing  to  do  with  each  other.  Whatever 
they have in common according to this low-
er level descriptions has nothing to do with 
the truth of the upper level generalizations. 
One example to this point could be economic 
general statements, such as those concerned 
with  monetary  exchange  (e.g.  Gersham’s 
law).  Nevertheless  money  can  have  differ-
ent physical make-ups, like coins of different 
metals and sizes, banknotes, a certain electri-
cal charge in the memory of a computer (in 
the  case  of  electronic  money),  they  can  be 
wampoons and so on. Such examples strong-
ly suggest that any description of the physical 
realization of money must be wildly disjunc-
tive. Nevertheless when it comes to monetary 
exchange, whatever the physical structure of 
money, we are bound to attend to the upper 
functional level because there are here inter-
esting generalizations that otherwise would 
be missed.
Of course, there is also a backlash. 
According to Kim microstructure is crucial 
for having genuine natural kinds because the 
macrophysical properties are determined by 
microstructure. Take for instance jade, which 
is not a true mineral kind. “Jade” designates 
actually two different substances, with un-
like  molecular  structures,  namely  jadeite 
and nephrite, although its surface proper-
ties might be similar, and we might employ 
both substances for similar purposes, which 
makes us to employ the naïve taxonomy we 
use in our daily lives. Nevertheless being 
jade cannot be a scientific predicate, as any 122 Change and Leadership
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putative law containing it has problems with 
projectability.  We  simply  won’t  have  any 
guarantee that any new instance of jade will 
behave in a the way we anticipate it would 
do, as we would expect by inductive reason-
ing based on the properties of a given pool of 
jade items we already investigated. It might 
for instance, simply turn out that all the sam-
ples of jade examined so far by scientists  in 
order to determine how it behaves in cer-
tain circumstances – for instance how it re-
acts to a certain substance - might be actually 
nephrite, and we have no way to extrapolate 
the results to a new instance of jade which 
is made out of jadeite. What guarantees the 
similarity in behavior is the microstructure 
of the instances. Were jade to have a unitary 
microstructure, we would be entitled to pre-
dict from the instances we already exam-
ined the behavior any future jade piece will 
have. Entities having similar microstructure 
behave similarly. Thus it is necessary to be-
long to a given natural kind to share the same 
microstructure, which in turn, as Kim quite 
elegantly shows allows a smooth microstruc-
tural reduction. (Kim 1992)
We won’t try a direct refutation of one 
or the other of the arguments produced by 
one or another of the two antagonistic ap-
proaches in order to establish its indispens-
ability when it comes to determining what is 
to count as a natural kind. The dispute be-
tween the two camps already generated an 
abundant literature, to which we won’t at-
tempt to add. What we intend is propose a 
third way of typing.  It preserves the mul-
tiple realization, while being irreducible to 
both previous approaches. In this respect, 
we will try to get as much help as we can 
from a case study in the very field that kick-
started functionalism.  Namely, we will try 
to examine what would work as an effective 
procedure for categorizing the modalities, 
therefore some of cognitive processes. What 
this analysis will put forward is a method of 
categorization that is neither functional nor 
microstructural. This pleads for a multitude 
of approaches when it comes to defining 
classes in special sciences, turning special sci-
ences into a patchwork with local rules rather 
than an unified landscape, where one meth-
od would assert its hegemony. Regardless 
of the value of the functional approach, the 
microstructural individuation of scientific 
kind and even the functional approach to be 
supplemented by another approach, that re-
lies on the evolution of a certain structure (be 
it described in terms applying to its macro-
physical or microphysical makeup), not on 
its intrinsic characteristics. 
Thus, what we would like to do is re-
view the criteria traditionally employed for 
individuating the sense modalities. They are 
a mix of functional and microstructural ap-
proaches, which unfortunately don’t succeed 
to establish a viable criterion for what is to be   
a certain sense. The modern discussion on the 
issue of the modality individuation was prac-
tically  initiated  by  Grice  (Grice  1962),  who 
identifies 4 criteria by which senses could be 
distinguished. To these four criteria, which 
acquired both friends and foes,  the  litera-
ture on the subject added a few more, that we 
need to discuss also. As a result, we can iden-
tify seven criteria that can provide support in 
our attempt to have clear cut scientific kinds. 
1.One way to decide what counts as a 
certain modality  is to rely on what we be-
come aware by the means of them. For in-
stance sight makes us perceive whiteness 
and or roundness, while hearing makes us 
perceive sounds of a certain pitch, loudness 123 Change and Leadership
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or with certain tone qualities1. This is at the 
root a commonsense functionalist approach 
to individuating the modalities. The core in-
tuition is that we “hear” or “see” such exter-
nal properties of things, which impress our 
senses and this sensing of specific qualities 
is what is to be a certain modality. But al-
though  many times folk psychology might 
get our mental states right and inspire valid 
approaches in science, coming up with clear 
cut  formulae  inspired  by  it,  isn’t  always 
easy. In occurrence, the present attempt to 
get criteria for typing doesn’t seem to work. 
On one hand, certain advances in this field 
of research, in conjunction with rather well 
studied phenomena,  show that none of the 
proper contents of sight is necessary. First, it 
is not necessary to see colors in order to have 
vision – total achromatopsia does not pre-
vent us from attributing sight. Also, there is 
the case described by Zeki (Zeki at al. 1999) 
, of a patient whose visual experience was 
limited to colors only. He was insensitive to 
shapes, spatial position and, generally speak-
ing,  none of the other contents populating 
our vision. These two pathologies encompass 
practically the whole  range of visual expe-
riences of men, so none of the things vision 
makes us aware seems to be required. On 
the other hand becoming aware that a cer-
tain thing has a definite color or shape can 
be done by the means of other senses (for in-
stance because we hear someone telling us 
that this is the case). Therefore this approach 
cannot provide us with sufficient criteria for 
a certain modality. 
1  The proprieties involved should be clearly dis-
tinguished from those of the subjective experien-
ces and of the physical phenomena, making possi-
ble a certain type of sensory experience, that will 
be discussed below.
2. senses can be told apart  by the special 
introspective character of the experience they 
sustain. Regardless of what we learn through 
them, the experience of seeing is qualitative-
ly different from the experience of hearing. 
The sheer difference of what when we subjec-
tively experience when we see or hear makes 
us capable to tell them apart. This criterion, 
of a definite philosophical origin,  makes 
use of the qualia that it functionalizes. They 
act as triggers for a certain internal process 
that makes us aware of the different types of 
perceiving.
But as Keeley notices  (Keeley. 2002. pp. 
23-25) such a criterion has difficulties dealing   
with the vomeronasal sense. The peculiarity 
of vomeronasal sense is that  detects phero-
mones but it does not produce any accom-
panying qualia. Although the evidence for 
such a system is piling up, the existence of 
a vomeronasal system in humans is contro-
versial, as Keeley dully notices. Nevertheless, 
the  argument can be completed, so that it 
could cope with these prospects.. What we 
should notice above all is that the problem 
is conceptual. We can very well conceive a 
sense that feeds data into cognitive subsys-
tems that are inaccessible to the conscious 
parts of our psyche, thus failing to generate 
any qualia. After all, much of the data the 
nervous system processes remains uncon-
scious. A scientist needs to operate with such 
a concept of sense, which does not require in-
dividuation by qualia, in order even to for-
mulate its hypotheses. And do we know that 
in animals where such a system is functional 
it does produce qualia? To my knowledge 
no scientist has approached such a problem, 
let alone making qualia a necessary criterion 
for asserting that a certain species possess a 
specific sense. Therefore, the attribution of 124 Change and Leadership
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modalities does not seem to depend on  pre-
suming specific qualia.
3. Another criterion that has been ad-
vanced relies features of the physical events 
which activate them. It  ultimately substitutes 
the typing of stimuli in terms of the macro-
scopic  properties  (color,  shape  and  so  on) 
with their microphysical basis, as described 
in the language of physics. This is the crite-
rion endorsed by Heil (Heil 1983). According 
to Heil modalities are to be distinguished (in-
sofar as possible) by reference to the kinds of 
“physical stimulation” enabling the  creature 
to extract information from the environment 
(Heil 1983, p.8). For instance seeing extracts 
information from light, hearing from cer-
tain types of pressure waves and so on. Heil 
admits that senses cannot be sharply distin-
guished. Nevertheless, if one attempts to use 
such a criterion to draw sharp demarcations, 
he will face serious problems, especially with 
constructing a set of physical events that is 
necessary for individuating senses. For in-
stance nocioperception, that is perception of 
pain, is activated by a vast variety of physi-
cal events, none of them necessary for feeling 
pain. Contact with the substances liberated 
by the stings of the nettle or electric shock 
produce pain in humans but for other other 
species it might be innocuous, or irritating 
substances might fail altogether to activate 
pain detectors, which are activated instead 
by other events. Actually, for each type of 
physical event producing pain in humans, 
we can imagine a species that are insensitive 
to it, while still possessing nocioperception, 
so none of them is necessary.
4.  The  fourth  (and  the  last)  Gricean 
criterion is the internal mechanisms of the 
senses, or as Keely puts it, the character of 
the putative sense organs and their modes of 
connection  with  the  brain.(Keeley  2002:13). 
We should look at the anatomy of the senso-
ry organs and of the nervous system. Thus, 
we need to find a certain organ responding to 
certain types of physical stimuli, certain de-
terminate nerves and a certain organ, like the 
brain, where these neurons lead to. This is an 
obviously microstructural criterion. Anyway, 
the it will have to deal with he anatomical di-
versity of the sense organs emphasized by 
Pacherie  (Pacherie  1997:  19).  We  can’t  take 
as reference the peculiar anatomy of human 
sense organs, as the compound eyes of in-
sects are very different in their anatomy.  We 
shall come back on this criterion as on one 
hand, I shall attempt to show, as it is not en-
tirely devoid of any value. On the other hand 
we have to face the fact that Pacherie points 
at one of its genuine weaknesses. 
5. There is also the criterion of “dedica-
tion”. (Keeley 2002, p. 17), that is “the evolu-
tionary or developmental importance of the 
putative sense to an organism “. We should 
not attribute a certain sensory modality un-
less the sensed proprieties are part of the en-
vironmental variables to which the organism 
is evolutionarily attuned through past natu-
ral selection. For instance we should not pos-
it an electric sense just because we can sense 
electric discharge from a battery we put on 
our tongue. Criterion (5) attempts to select as 
sense just what is biologically important for 
the organism. The problem is that any physi-
cal stimulation that the organism can detect 
can become important for it. Just because an 
organism can respond to a class of stimuli 
does not mean they are important for him.
The problem is that from an evolution-
ary standpoint it is impossible to trace demar-
cation lines between  what is important and 
what is not. Being shaped by natural selection 125 Change and Leadership
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for performing a certain function  can’t help 
us here, nor, as we shall see, trying to make 
this criterion a bit milder. As it happens, the 
biological function an organ performs shifts. 
Expatiation is quite a common phenomenon 
in the living world.  It makes structures that 
evolved to serve a certain biological function 
to be subsequently recruited for serving an-
other. Sometimes the environmental condi-
tions change, so that the function does not 
get to serve anymore the purpose it was se-
lected for, but continues to serve its exapted 
function. So what is now a sense for some-
thing, might have have appeared for entirely 
different reasons. Take for instance a species 
marine animals S, which evolved a tongue 
whose purpose is to pick the chemical trail 
left by pray A. As it happens the peculiar 
structure of the tongue enables it to pick the 
electric discharges. Sometimes in its evolu-
tionary history pray A disappears and pray 
B enters the scene.  The muscle discharges of 
pray B can be picked by S, which can thus 
hunt it effectively. Shouldn’t we credit S or 
with an electrical sense? We probably would, 
but that would mean the demise of this cri-
terion. Thus, any physical event an organ-
ism can detect can become a stimulus with a 
certain evolutionary import, given the right 
circumstances.
One might reformulate the criterion 
more liberally, by dropping the condition 
that it should have evolved  specially for 
that purpose. Thus biological import might 
be taken to refer to anything that has conse-
quence with regard to survival.  The electric-
ity detection capabilities might be affecting   
S’s survival positively or negatively (for in-
stance if eating B leads to poisoning, in the 
long run).  But if pray B disappears, and as a 
consequence such a detection capability loses 
its importance, should we say that the animal 
has lost one of its senses? What if we pur-
posefully introduce B into S’s environment? 
Should we then say that we endowed S with 
a novel sense? But the strangest consequence 
is this: imagine that some of  the members of 
S learn to use the electricity detection capa-
bilities of their tongues in order to hunt B, 
while some don’t2.   Thus electrical detection 
is important for some of the members of S 
while for others is irrelevant. Should we say 
that some of the members of that species has 
an extra sense while others lack, moreover in 
the conditions where there is no anatomical 
difference between them?
6. Another criterion proposed by 
Keeley is the ability to discriminate behav-
iorally between stimuli that differ only in 
terms of a particular physical energy type ” 
(Keely 2002, p. 15). It is peculiar application 
of a method routinely employed scientists 
and philosophers embracing the functional-
ist creed in order to infer that someone has 
a certain property. Nevertheless, it is made 
to yield, amongst the  criteria advanced by 
Keeley for determining modalities, probably 
the weakest. We have no idea how this can 
apply to people who suffer from total paraly-
sis. Should we hold that they are deprived of 
hearing or sight just because there is no be-
havior they can issue?  Also it is hard to see 
what these energy levels could mean when it 
comes to senses like taste. What taste detects 
is differences in molecular composition of 
various substances, rather than the differenc-
es in kinetic energy of the molecules (which 
is detected by thermal receptors).
2 This might be imagined as a result of a regular 
naturally occurring reinforcement process, where-
by some individuals are by mere chance rewarded 
a sufficient number of times, at the rignt moments, 
to acquire the new behavior.126 Change and Leadership
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7. There is another idea that has been 
pressed too into work, at least tentatively, 
as a criterion for individuating the senses, 
which  tries  to  exploit  Noë  and  O’Regan’s 
enactive treatement of perception. It is this 
time a functional approach, which neverthe-
less replicates on this upper echelon a prob-
lem we previously encountered with regard 
to a microstructural criterion.  According to 
it, for each sense there corresponds a type of 
exploration of the world that is underpinned 
by of specific “sensorimotor contingencies”, 
that is laws governing the sensory changes 
produced by determinate motor actions (Noë 
and O’Regan, 2001, p. 943). For instance to 
see is to be capable to master vision-related 
rules of sensorimotor contingency.  It is un-
clear how much this idea was intended to 
be turned into a full-blown criterion by Noë 
and O’Regan, but some others have taken it 
to function as such (Auvray and Myin 2009, 
p.1046).  The trouble is that  in spite of the 
role sensorimotor contingencies may have 
in the way we sense the world, they cannot 
provide necessary conditions for circum-
scribing modalities. For a start, in order to 
decide that  whether a certain organism hav-
ing photoreceptors see or not, we will rather 
need to know which these specific contingen-
cies are. Saying that they are vision-related is 
clearly circular. In order to escape circularity, 
we need a way to independently pick them 
up, which is really a tall order.  We quickly 
find ourselves mired in basically the same 
difficulties Pacherie showed must be faced 
by anyone trying to exploit the anatomy of 
the sensory organs. The reason lies too in the 
diversity of mechanisms we must expect in 
the living world. Thus, we might envisage 
the possibility that these sensorimotor con-
tingencies, associated to a certain modality, 
might vary from species to species. For in-
stance finding that cats have wildly differ-
ent sensorimotor contingencies compared 
to humans, won’t preclude biologists or an-
imal psychologist attributing them vision. 
Moreover, genetic or developmental acci-
dents might modify these mechanisms even 
further, possibly without any principled lim-
it. The viability of the criterion depends on 
effectively proposing an independent set of 
sufficient and, more important for us, neces-
sary conditions for any possible sensorimo-
tor contingency linked to a specific modality, 
which nobody has attempted.
We have tracked so far a few analyses 
that, beyond rather merely methodological 
proposal of the two camps we mentioned in 
the beginning of this paper, have effectively 
tried to come up with criteria for individuat-
ing sensory modalities Although none had a 
doctrinal ax to grind, they could be easily pi-
geonholed in one or another of the two grand 
approaches. They all failed, but their demise 
leaves us with a heritage. We can learn from 
their shortcomings, and and build viable cri-
terion for individuating sensory modalities. 
Ultimately, this way of individuating the 
senses will help us better appreciate the pat-
terns of conceptualization in special scienc-
es, attesting to typing practices that which 
cut across the functional – microstructural 
divide. 
We propose to look once again at the cri-
teria four and seven. Both relied on the inner 
mechanisms, one of the level of the anatomy 
and the other at the level of the “software” 
it implements. Both failed because they had 
as a consequence an unpalatable chauvinism, 
which takes a certain mechanism.
For one thing, biological kinds, be they 
cognitive or otherwise, require a certain 127 Change and Leadership
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degree  of flexibility with regard to the pe-
culiar makeup of mechanisms they desig-
nate, even within one and the same species. 
For instance a certain mutation might intro-
duce  modifications in the standard way a 
certain physiological process is carried out. 
For instance a certain mutation, through the 
physiological changes it induces,  might in-
duce color blindness, yet we won’t consider 
the color blind persons as being deprived of 
vision. Also disease can modify the way the 
way that a certain biological process unfolds. 
Yet we won’t for that matter place it under 
another biological category. For instance 
digestion affected by an ailment will still 
e considered digestion, albeit pathological 
digestion. 
The case of a mutation introducing vari-
ants is even more instructive. The nonstan-
dard way of carying out the task might grant 
the owner of such an organism an evolution-
ary advantage. For this reason it can spread 
in the population where it arose. The group 
characterized by that mutation can even dif-
ferentiate itself to the point as to starting a 
new species. This is after all, inter alia, the 
way speciation is presented by evolutionary 
theory. Such remarks are capable to put us 
on the right track with regard to a criterion 
for modalities. Take a certain structure which 
we know characterizes the way at some point 
in time the cognition of a given species nor-
mally works – in occurrence a certain sensory 
modality. Some modifications of this struc-
ture will still have to instantiate that kind, al-
though the way it works, spelled out in the 
language of the upper or lower level theory 
doesn’t conform to a standard pattern. 
We don’t pretend that all such modifi-
cations of mechanisms preserve the sensory 
modality. Certain changes will definitely 
impair vision. Nevertheless, I think we can 
draw quite a neat line here. The modifica-
tions that suppress sight  or hearing will sup-
press any delivery of the information of the 
sort the previous structure delivered to the 
other structures of the brain. For instance 
there are instances such as those of blind-
sight.  In  blindsight  cases  subjects  that  are 
cortically blind, and for that matter are not 
consciously aware of certain events that we 
usually become aware of by visual means, 
are capable to issue certain responses to vi-
sual stimuli. The lack of cortical awareness is 
most certainly due to damage in the primary 
visual cortex, which cuts the flow of informa-
tion towards other brain areas.  Nevertheless 
seemingly paradoxically, scientists are still 
capable to credit such patients with sight. 
There are several theories about  the neu-
ral mechanism that enable such subjects to 
unconsciously see events outside them (see 
Weiskrantz  1990,  Kalat  2009,  pp.  169-170, 
Cowey 2010 etc) . Whatever the truth, sight 
can be attributed exactly to the measure to 
which parts of the normal information are 
delivered, by the means of cortical structures 
that are still intact, further into other subsys-
tems such as control of the eye movement 
or any other parts of our neural architecture 
that control the responses the subject is still 
capable to issue. If we are to scrutinize to the 
scientific practice, we will observe that sight 
is attributed to the extent that such informa-
tion is made available downstream to other 
structures whose role is to take over this in-
formation, and denied to the extent that the 
contrary happens. 
Given these limitations, we have here a 
recursive procedure by the means of which 
to determine what is to  be allowed to exem-
plify a certain modality. It is not having a 128 Change and Leadership
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specifiable structure. The way sight or hear-
ing work can be modified in many ways. 
Having sight or any other modality is rather 
belonging to a certain continuum of modifi-
cations, as effected initally by evolution by 
natural selection, which created the ur-mech-
anisms for each  modality and continued to 
tinker with them, but also by many other 
processes that impact sensory cognition.3
More generally and one step closer to 
our ultimate goal, this approach to sensory 
modality individuation documents a certain 
way scientists proceed in carving the kinds 
they use. It is neither functional nor micro-
structural. This continuum is ensured by 
a process of change that occurs both on the 
level of “hardware” as in that of “software”. 
Damage to certain pathways or a genetic ac-
cident change can impact the way our neu-
ral structures work, which in its turn may 
impact the functional level. Also, certain odd 
developmental circumstances can result in 
nonstandard  routines involved in informa-
tion gathering. This rule of drawing does not 
make reference to any of the levels involved. 
Moreover, it isn’t reducible to any of the other 
two approaches, as it doesn’t employ a speci-
fiable structure, describable in the language 
of the lower level theory or in that of the up-
per level one, because any such specification 
would imply the chauvinism we were talk-
ing about above, and that was emphasized 
by Pacherie. 
3 This continuum might be shaped by selective pre-
ssures “that attune” our senses to environmental 
significant events (as crterion 5 requests)  or not. 
Evolution is not the only force impacting peculiar 
instance of a certain sort of biological processes. 
As we have seen, the changes can be induced by 
various processes such as maladies that disturb 
the regular physiological mechanisms.
This isn’t just  something that is specif-
ic to cognition. The same rules can account 
to other scientific practices,  such as those in 
economics. Take for instance money. When 
they were invented money were pieces of 
stamped by an authority so that it would 
guarantee the content of the token. But as 
Fodor  emphasized,  money  can’t  be  typed 
by pointing at the microstructure. At first, 
money were made in electrum (a natural al-
loy of gold and silver), then in gold, in silver 
, copper, paper or as, electronic money, their 
realization base is whatever material is em-
ployed for storing information abot people’s 
accounts4.  What Fodor failed to see is that 
money paticipate in a variety of exchange 
patterns.  But the pattern of economic inter-
action and exchange can be endlessly modi-
fied to. The limit is only our whim, as we can 
legislate at will so that to change one or an-
other of the patterns of economic interaction 
in our society. Therefore we won’t be able to 
pick up an uniquely describable pattern of 
interaction where money play a role, so that 
we could individuate money irrevocably. 
Nevertheless we won’t be deprived of such 
an economic kind, as we can define it with 
reference to a certain evolutionary process, 
to which various forms of money participate.
This way of carving kinds is not an-
tagonistic to microstructural typing, nor to 
employing functional relations to the same 
end. One can legitimately define functional 
categories. For instance one can speak about 
modern human speech production or pri-
mate vision, by identifying the patterns into 
which such types of processes enter in the 
4 Although the istory can be traced even further 
back, to some premonetary items used in exchan-
ge (for a comprehensive history of money see Da-
vies 2002)129 Change and Leadership
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case of each current species. Thus, it might 
be discovered that modern linguistic faculty 
might employ certain defining algorithms in 
order to compose syntactically complex ut-
terances, that can be spelled out functionally. 
Modern speech might have no forerunner in 
a simper form of verbal behavior hominids 
were capable of.  The modes of communica-
tion employed by our ancestors might have 
lacked those algorithms, which are essential 
for language. In this scenario, there would 
have been an explosion of language that oc-
curred with the emergence of the Homo sapi-
ens, that would allow only functional typing 
of the linguistic processing, making the lan-
guage faculty  a local phenomenon peculiar 
to our species (and which might never evolve 
any further). The only theoretical endeavor 
scientists can engage into would be deci-
phering these algorithms bursting onto the 
scene  of  evolution.  We  can  even  hold  that 
such a functional upper-level architecture   
described by the algorithm that produce 
speech reduces to a neural architecture that 
is idiosyncratic to the homo sapiens. But the 
opposite scenario is also possible. It might 
equally turn out that our ancestors did pos-
ses a simpler form language, based on a more 
rudimentary system of transformations, that 
engendered a different verbal behavior and 
which is underpinned by less developed neu-
ral structures.  This simpler functional struc-
ture is the one that evolved into our current 
language faculty (which we might describe 
functionally at the psychological level or mi-
crostructurally, on the neural level), and in 
this case having a proper concept imposes to 
take the route we are pointing at. Moreover 
our stance  makes us capable to specify local 
functional structures, describing how a cer-
tain cognitive process works in one precise 
population at a given time, as well as with 
a microstructural account of what makes its 
members tick. This situation illustrates how 
the functional and the microstructural typing 
as well as the approach we are trying to make 
visible can coexist and pressed into the line 
of fire to provide us with the conceptual am-
munition needed to tackle the need for prin-
cipled ways to organize our knowledge. 
Our approach does not of course claim 
to refute the reproaches made by the micro-
functionalistic camp to the idea of functional 
theory. This is an entirely different and quite a 
vast issue. Nevertheless it undermines its he-
gemonic and reductionist pretenses. It shows 
that we can have a kind which underpinned 
by a heterogeneous group microstructures, 
but which are held together, under the um-
brella of the same kind, by sharing the same 
history of change . 
This phenomenon is not only of episte-
mological import. It is extremely important 
for the leadership in times of change. The 
morals for the manager is that s/he should 
not always find essential structures that an-
imate organizations or economic practices 
persisting over time. Sometimes the phenom-
ena in the realm of special sciences, from bi-
ology to economy, have to deal with concepts 
spanning over an array that could potentially 
end up including members with no struc-
tural commonalties. Nevertheless, our paper   
provides him or her with an outlook that can 
help him or her tackle the change principally, 
encouraging setting analysis units at the level 
of these variegated continuum. 
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